Faji, sipas nj\u00eb prej analizave mbi d\u00ebshtimin e Izraelit m\u00eb 7 tetor 2023, lidhet me at\u00eb q\u00eb n\u00eb hebraisht quhet \u201ckonceptzia\u201d.<\/p>\n
Termi do t\u00eb thot\u00eb \u201ckoncept\u201d ose \u201cperceptim\u201d, por n\u00eb kontekstin izraelit p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkruar nj\u00eb grup bindjesh t\u00eb gabuara q\u00eb, kur kthehen n\u00eb pik\u00ebpamje dominuese, pengojn\u00eb leximin e sakt\u00eb t\u00eb informacioneve q\u00eb ndodhen p\u00ebrpara institucioneve.<\/p>\n
Nj\u00eb situat\u00eb e ngjashme ishte shfaqur edhe para Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Yom Kippurit n\u00eb vitin 1973.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb, nj\u00eb prej bindjeve kryesore t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs izraelite ishte se Egjipti nuk do t\u00eb sulmonte pa siguruar m\u00eb par\u00eb nj\u00eb ep\u00ebrsi t\u00eb mjaftueshme ajrore. Egjipti sulmoi gjithsesi dhe Izraeli u kap n\u00eb befasi.<\/p>\n
Pes\u00eb dekada m\u00eb von\u00eb, sipas ish-drejtuesve dhe analist\u00ebve t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs izraelite, nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr bindje e gabuar luajti rol n\u00eb d\u00ebshtimin p\u00ebr t\u00eb parashikuar sulmin e Hamasit.<\/p>\n
Sipas Tamir Hayman, i cili drejtoi Aman, sh\u00ebrbimin e inteligjenc\u00ebs ushtarake izraelite, nga viti 2018 deri n\u00eb 2021, p\u00ebr vite me radh\u00eb n\u00eb Izrael mbizot\u00ebronte ideja se Hamasi nuk k\u00ebrkonte nj\u00eb p\u00ebrballje t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb.<\/p>\n
Vler\u00ebsimi ishte se grupi nuk kishte kapacitetin p\u00ebr nj\u00eb luft\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb dhe se synonte kryesisht t\u00eb konsolidonte kontrollin mbi Rripin e Gaz\u00ebs, nd\u00ebrsa k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi kryesor pritej n\u00eb Bregun Per\u00ebndimor ose nga Libani.<\/p>\n
Kjo bindje b\u00ebri q\u00eb, sipas kritik\u00ebve t\u00eb sistemit, nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e informacioneve t\u00eb mbledhura nga aparati i gjer\u00eb i inteligjenc\u00ebs izraelite t\u00eb minimizoheshin ose t\u00eb interpretoheshin n\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me teorin\u00eb ekzistuese.<\/p>\n
Paralajm\u00ebrimet e fundit para sulmit<\/p>\n
N\u00eb dit\u00ebt para 7 tetorit 2023 u mblodh\u00ebn disa t\u00eb dh\u00ebna q\u00eb tregonin p\u00ebr p\u00ebrgatitje t\u00eb pazakonta t\u00eb Hamasit. Sipas Hayman, 13 informacione t\u00eb ndryshme u mor\u00ebn nga 4 deri m\u00eb 7 tetor, por ato nuk \u00e7uan n\u00eb ngritjen e nivelit t\u00eb alarmit.<\/p>\n
Gjat\u00eb nat\u00ebs para sulmit, oficer\u00ebt n\u00eb detyr\u00eb mor\u00ebn n\u00eb shqyrtim vet\u00ebm tre prej tyre dhe secilit informacion iu gjet nj\u00eb shpjegim alternativ. T\u00eb dh\u00ebnat u konsideruan pjes\u00eb e aktiviteteve rutin\u00eb t\u00eb Hamasit.<\/p>\n
Nj\u00eb prej sinjaleve m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme ishte aktivizimi i rreth 45 kartave SIM izraelite n\u00eb Rripin e Gaz\u00ebs, duke filluar nga 5 tetori.<\/p>\n
Sipas analizave t\u00eb m\u00ebvonshme, k\u00ebto pajisje u p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn gjat\u00eb sulmit p\u00ebr t\u00eb dokumentuar dhe transmetuar pamje nga sulmet ndaj komuniteteve izraelite.<\/p>\n
Megjithat\u00eb, edhe ky sinjal u interpretua si nj\u00eb st\u00ebrvitje, pasi raste t\u00eb ngjashme ishin regjistruar m\u00eb her\u00ebt.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn koh\u00eb, ishin v\u00ebrejtur edhe aktivitete t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb pazakonta: hapja e qendrave operative n\u00ebntok\u00ebsore t\u00eb Hamasit, nj\u00eb p\u00ebrgjim ku p\u00ebrmendej p\u00ebrgatitja e raketave dhe l\u00ebvizje t\u00eb dyshimta t\u00eb nj\u00ebsive me dron\u00eb.<\/p>\n
Sipas Amos Harel, gazetar i Haaretz dhe autor i nj\u00eb libri mbi d\u00ebshtimin e 7 Tetorit, komandanti i Komand\u00ebs Jugore, Yaron Finkelman, dhe zyrtar\u00ebt e inteligjenc\u00ebs vler\u00ebsonin se Hamasi mund t\u00eb ishte duke p\u00ebrgatitur vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb inkursion t\u00eb kufizuar.<\/p>\n
Mund\u00ebsi t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb konsideruara ishin nj\u00eb st\u00ebrvitje ushtarake ose p\u00ebrgatitje mbrojt\u00ebse ndaj nj\u00eb sulmi t\u00eb mundsh\u00ebm izraelit.<\/p>\n
P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb arsye, kryeministri Benjamin Netanyahu nuk u alarmua n\u00eb at\u00eb faz\u00eb. P\u00ebrgjat\u00eb kufirit mbet\u00ebn forcat q\u00eb ishin pjes\u00eb e dislokimit rutin\u00eb, rreth 767 ushtar\u00eb dhe tre tanke.<\/p>\n
Sinjalet ishin shfaqur shum\u00eb m\u00eb her\u00ebt<\/p>\n
Sipas materialeve t\u00eb p\u00ebrmendura n\u00eb analiz\u00eb, paralajm\u00ebrimet nuk nis\u00ebn n\u00eb tetor 2023. N\u00eb vitin 2016, ministri i at\u00ebhersh\u00ebm i Mbrojtjes, Avigdor Lieberman, i kishte d\u00ebrguar Netanyahut dhe shefit t\u00eb Shtabit t\u00eb P\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm nj\u00eb memorandum sekret prej 11 faqesh.<\/p>\n
Dokumenti paralajm\u00ebronte se forcat speciale t\u00eb Hamasit, Nukhba, po p\u00ebrgatiteshin t\u00eb kalonin barrier\u00ebn kufitare, t\u00eb sulmonin komunitetet izraelite dhe t\u00eb merrnin pengje.<\/p>\n
Nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr sinjal i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm erdhi n\u00eb maj 2021, kur Hamasi l\u00ebshoi raketa drejt Jerusalemit. Sipas Hayman, ky episod duhej t\u00eb kishte v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb pik\u00ebpyetje bindjen se Hamasi nuk do t\u00eb rrezikonte stabilitetin e Gaz\u00ebs p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb zhvillimeve n\u00eb territoret palestineze.<\/p>\n
Por nj\u00eb nga provat m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme u gjet rreth nj\u00eb vit m\u00eb von\u00eb.<\/p>\n
Inteligjenca ushtarake izraelite siguroi nj\u00eb dokument rreth 40-faq\u00ebsh t\u00eb Hamasit, t\u00eb cilin e quajti \u201cJericho Wall\u201d. Dokumenti, q\u00eb datonte nga gushti i vitit 2021, p\u00ebrshkruante nj\u00eb plan sulmi q\u00eb p\u00ebrfshinte p\u00ebrdorimin e raketave, dron\u00ebve, \u00e7arjen e barrier\u00ebs kufitare, dep\u00ebrtimin me mjete t\u00eb ndryshme dhe marrjen e pengjeve.<\/p>\n
Dokumenti u b\u00eb publik m\u00eb von\u00eb p\u00ebrmes nj\u00eb raportimi t\u00eb New York Times.<\/p>\n
Sipas Harel, inteligjenca izraelite kishte siguruar disa versione t\u00eb k\u00ebtij plani. Megjithat\u00eb, informacioni nuk u trajtua si nj\u00eb tregues se Hamasi mund t\u00eb realizonte nj\u00eb sulm t\u00eb p\u00ebrmasave t\u00eb tilla.<\/p>\n
Hamasi kontribuoi n\u00eb krijimin e nj\u00eb perceptimi t\u00eb gabuar<\/p>\n
Analist\u00ebt e cituar n\u00eb tekst argumentojn\u00eb se edhe Hamasi nd\u00ebrtoi me kujdes nj\u00eb imazh q\u00eb favorizonte bindjen izraelite se grupi nuk po p\u00ebrgatitej p\u00ebr nj\u00eb luft\u00eb t\u00eb madhe.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb shtator 2023, Hamasi organizoi protesta p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb barrier\u00ebs me k\u00ebrkesa p\u00ebr m\u00eb shum\u00eb leje pune p\u00ebr banor\u00ebt e Gaz\u00ebs dhe p\u00ebr rritjen e mb\u00ebshtetjes financiare nga Katari.<\/p>\n
K\u00ebto veprime krijuan p\u00ebrshtypjen se grupi po k\u00ebrkonte t\u00eb ruante nj\u00eb lloj stabiliteti n\u00eb Rripin e Gaz\u00ebs, nd\u00ebrsa n\u00eb prapasken\u00eb po p\u00ebrgatitej sulmi.<\/p>\n
Sipas tekstit, Yahya Sinwar e kufizoi informacionin mbi operacionin \u201cP\u00ebrmbytja e Al-Aksas\u201d n\u00eb nj\u00eb rreth shum\u00eb t\u00eb ngusht\u00eb njer\u00ebzish. Sulmi nisi n\u00eb or\u00ebn 06:29 t\u00eb 7 tetorit dhe rezultoi n\u00eb vrasjen e rreth 1.200 personave dhe marrjen peng t\u00eb 251 t\u00eb tjer\u00ebve, sipas shifrave t\u00eb cituara n\u00eb tekst.<\/p>\n
P\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsia dhe roli i Netanyahut<\/p>\n
Analiza e vendos nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsis\u00eb te institucionet politike dhe t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb kryeministrin Benjamin Netanyahu.<\/p>\n
Kritika ndaj tij lidhet me faktin se ai kishte qen\u00eb p\u00ebr vite n\u00eb qeverisje dhe kishte mb\u00ebshtetur nj\u00eb politik\u00eb q\u00eb lejonte ruajtjen e Hamasit si autoritet de facto n\u00eb Gaza, nd\u00ebrsa Autoriteti Palestinez mbetej i dob\u00ebt.<\/p>\n
Sipas k\u00ebsaj qasjeje, ruajtja e ndarjes mes Gaz\u00ebs dhe Bregut Per\u00ebndimor shihej si nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb penguar krijimin e nj\u00eb shteti palestinez t\u00eb unifikuar.<\/p>\n
Megjithat\u00eb, analiza thekson se kjo politik\u00eb u mb\u00ebshtet mbi nj\u00eb vler\u00ebsim t\u00eb gabuar t\u00eb kapaciteteve dhe synimeve t\u00eb Hamasit.<\/p>\n
\u201cHumb\u00ebm aft\u00ebsin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar gjuh\u00ebn e armikut\u201d<\/p>\n
Michael Milshtein, analist dhe ish-drejtues i Departamentit p\u00ebr \u00c7\u00ebshtjet Palestineze n\u00eb Aman, e p\u00ebrshkruan problemin si nj\u00eb \u201chendek kulturor\u201d.<\/p>\n
Sipas tij, institucionet izraelite humb\u00ebn aft\u00ebsin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar sinjalet q\u00eb vinte Hamasi, edhe kur ato ishin relativisht t\u00eb qarta.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuad\u00ebr p\u00ebrmenden edhe st\u00ebrvitjet e Hamasit gjat\u00eb viteve 2021-2023, ku militant\u00ebt p\u00ebrdornin skenar\u00eb t\u00eb ngjash\u00ebm me komunitetet izraelite dhe simulonin m\u00ebnyra t\u00eb ndryshme t\u00eb sulmit.<\/p>\n
Pas 7 Tetorit, inteligjenca ushtarake izraelite nd\u00ebrmori disa ndryshime. U krijua nj\u00eb struktur\u00eb e re p\u00ebr studimin e kultur\u00ebs islame, u rikthye rrjeti i inteligjenc\u00ebs njer\u00ebzore HUMINT p\u00ebrmes Nj\u00ebsis\u00eb 504 dhe u forcua puna me burimet e hapura.<\/p>\n
Q\u00ebllimi ishte t\u00eb korrigjohej ajo q\u00eb analist\u00ebt e konsiderojn\u00eb si nj\u00eb nga d\u00ebshtimet m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs izraelite: besimi se Hamasi do t\u00eb sillej sipas modelit q\u00eb Izraeli kishte nd\u00ebrtuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb fund, problemi i \u201ckonceptzias\u201d nuk ishte thjesht mungesa e informacionit. Sipas k\u00ebsaj analize, informacioni ekzistonte, por u interpretua p\u00ebrmes nj\u00eb bindjeje tashm\u00eb t\u00eb konsoliduar. Pik\u00ebrisht kjo b\u00ebri q\u00eb sinjalet e shumta t\u00eb mos bashkoheshin n\u00eb koh\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb pamje t\u00eb qart\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Faji, sipas nj\u00eb prej analizave mbi d\u00ebshtimin e Izraelit m\u00eb 7 tetor 2023, lidhet me…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":55164,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55161","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-bote"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55161","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=55161"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55161\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":55165,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55161\/revisions\/55165"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/55164"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=55161"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=55161"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=55161"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}