{"id":59656,"date":"2026-10-25T20:13:39","date_gmt":"2026-10-25T19:13:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/?p=59656"},"modified":"2026-10-25T20:13:39","modified_gmt":"2026-10-25T19:13:39","slug":"serbia-nen-hijen-e-frikes-strategjia-politike-e-vuciqit-dhe-mesazhi-per-rajonin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/?p=59656","title":{"rendered":"Serbia n\u00ebn hijen e frik\u00ebs: Strategjia politike e Vu\u00e7iqit dhe mesazhi p\u00ebr rajonin"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Isuf B.Bajrami<\/p>\n<p>Kur pushteti e kthen frik\u00ebn n\u00eb instrument qeverisjeje<\/p>\n<p>Serbia po p\u00ebrballet me nj\u00eb pyetje q\u00eb shkon p\u00ebrtej nj\u00eb zhvillimi t\u00eb vet\u00ebm politik ose nj\u00eb episodi t\u00eb izoluar n\u00eb Beograd: \u00e7far\u00eb ndodh kur pushteti e p\u00ebrdor pasigurin\u00eb si m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur kontrollin mbi shoq\u00ebrin\u00eb?<\/p>\n<p>Pamjet e automjeteve t\u00eb blinduara n\u00eb kryeqytetin serb dhe reagimi i analistes Ivana Stradner, e cila i krahasoi taktikat e presidentit Aleksandar Vu\u00e7iq me ato t\u00eb ish-udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit serb Sllobodan Millosheviq, e rikthyen k\u00ebt\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje n\u00eb v\u00ebmendjen publike.<\/p>\n<p>Stradner e interpretoi k\u00ebt\u00eb demonstrim t\u00eb forc\u00ebs si nj\u00eb form\u00eb frik\u00ebsimi. Ky \u00ebsht\u00eb vler\u00ebsimi i saj politik, jo nj\u00eb fakt i provuar mbi q\u00ebllimin e vendosjes s\u00eb automjeteve. Megjithat\u00eb, pyetja q\u00eb ngre \u00ebsht\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme: \u00e7far\u00eb mesazhi p\u00ebrcillet kur simbolika ushtarake shfaqet n\u00eb nj\u00eb shoq\u00ebri t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb nga tensionet politike?<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb nj\u00eb demokraci funksionale, pushteti mb\u00ebshtetet te besimi i qytetar\u00ebve, p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsia institucionale dhe konkurrenca politike. Kur k\u00ebto mekanizma dob\u00ebsohen, frika mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhet nj\u00eb mjet p\u00ebr ta orientuar opinionin publik, p\u00ebr ta paraqitur pushtetin si t\u00eb vetmin garantues t\u00eb stabilitetit dhe p\u00ebr t&#8217;i vendosur kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebt n\u00eb pozit\u00ebn e atyre q\u00eb rrezikojn\u00eb rendin.<\/p>\n<p>Pik\u00ebrisht k\u00ebtu duhet k\u00ebrkuar thelbi i debatit p\u00ebr Serbin\u00eb e sotme.<\/p>\n<p>\u00c7\u00ebshtja nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm se \u00e7far\u00eb b\u00ebn Vu\u00e7iqi n\u00eb nj\u00eb moment t\u00eb caktuar, por edhe se si funksionon sistemi politik rreth tij, \u00e7far\u00eb hap\u00ebsire u mbetet institucioneve t\u00eb pavarura dhe sa mund\u00ebsi kan\u00eb qytetar\u00ebt p\u00ebr t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtuar pushtetin pa u paraqitur si k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim p\u00ebr shtetin.<\/p>\n<p>Nj\u00eb pushtet q\u00eb e lidh stabilitetin me veten<\/p>\n<p>Aleksandar Vu\u00e7iqi ka qen\u00eb figura qendrore e politik\u00ebs serbe p\u00ebr m\u00eb shum\u00eb se nj\u00eb dekad\u00eb, fillimisht si kryeminist\u00ebr dhe m\u00eb pas si president. Gjat\u00eb k\u00ebsaj periudhe, pushteti i tij \u00ebsht\u00eb shoq\u00ebruar me shqet\u00ebsime t\u00eb vazhdueshme nga organizata vendore dhe nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare lidhur me p\u00ebrqendrimin e pushtetit, kushtet e konkurrenc\u00ebs politike, lirin\u00eb e medias dhe funksionimin e institucioneve demokratike.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00ebto shqet\u00ebsime nuk n\u00ebnkuptojn\u00eb se \u00e7do veprim i qeveris\u00eb serbe \u00ebsht\u00eb i motivuar nga frika. Ato, megjithat\u00eb, ngren\u00eb nj\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje themelore p\u00ebr funksionimin e demokracis\u00eb: sa e fort\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shoq\u00ebri kur stabiliteti politik identifikohet gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb me q\u00ebndrimin e nj\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsi n\u00eb pushtet?<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb sistemet ku nj\u00eb figur\u00eb politike dominon institucionet dhe komunikimin publik, krijohet rreziku q\u00eb debatet p\u00ebr politikat shtet\u00ebrore t\u00eb z\u00ebvend\u00ebsohen nga nj\u00eb ndarje e vazhdueshme nd\u00ebrmjet mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebsve dhe kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebve t\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb logjik\u00eb, kritika ndaj qeveris\u00eb mund t\u00eb paraqitet si sulm ndaj shtetit, kund\u00ebrshtimi politik si k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim ndaj stabilitetit dhe protestat si burim kaosi.<\/p>\n<p>Kjo m\u00ebnyr\u00eb e komunikimit ka pasoja p\u00ebrtej propagand\u00ebs. Ajo mund t\u00eb dob\u00ebsoj\u00eb besimin e qytetar\u00ebve te institucionet, ta ngushtoj\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00ebn p\u00ebr debat dhe ta b\u00ebj\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb ndarjen nd\u00ebrmjet interesit publik dhe interesit t\u00eb pushtetit.<\/p>\n<p>Megjithat\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb vler\u00ebsuar n\u00ebse nj\u00eb ngjarje konkrete \u00ebsht\u00eb pjes\u00eb e k\u00ebsaj logjike, duhet t\u00eb shqyrtohen faktet, deklaratat zyrtare dhe rrethanat e saj. Simbolika e forc\u00ebs mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb politike, por q\u00ebllimi i saj nuk mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktohet vet\u00ebm nga pamja.<\/p>\n<p>Frika si mesazh p\u00ebr shoq\u00ebrin\u00eb<\/p>\n<p>Frika politike nuk krijohet domosdoshm\u00ebrisht p\u00ebrmes dhun\u00ebs s\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb. Ajo mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtohet edhe p\u00ebrmes p\u00ebrs\u00ebritjes s\u00eb mesazheve p\u00ebr rrezikun, k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimet e jashtme, armiqt\u00eb e brendsh\u00ebm dhe nevoj\u00ebn p\u00ebr nj\u00eb udh\u00ebheqje t\u00eb fort\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Kur qytetar\u00ebve u p\u00ebrcillet vazhdimisht ideja se vendi \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebn k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim, v\u00ebmendja e tyre mund t\u00eb largohet nga pyetjet e zakonshme t\u00eb qeverisjes: gjendja ekonomike, korrupsioni, p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsia institucionale, cil\u00ebsia e sh\u00ebrbimeve publike dhe llogaridh\u00ebnia politike.<\/p>\n<p>Kjo nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se \u00e7do paralajm\u00ebrim p\u00ebr rrezik \u00ebsht\u00eb propagand\u00eb. Serbia, sikurse vendet e tjera t\u00eb rajonit, ka sfida reale t\u00eb siguris\u00eb dhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie t\u00eb nd\u00ebrlikuara me fqinj\u00ebt. Dallimi q\u00ebndron te m\u00ebnyra se si k\u00ebto \u00e7\u00ebshtje trajtohen dhe n\u00ebse informacioni u jepet qytetar\u00ebve p\u00ebr t&#8217;i kuptuar rreziqet, apo p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr t\u00eb prodhuar nj\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb p\u00ebrhershme alarmi.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00ebse frika b\u00ebhet pjes\u00eb e komunikimit t\u00eb zakonsh\u00ebm politik, pushteti mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrfitoj\u00eb nga nj\u00eb mekaniz\u00ebm i njohur: qytetar\u00ebt q\u00eb ndihen t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuar mund t\u00eb priren ta shohin vazhdim\u00ebsin\u00eb e udh\u00ebheqjes si alternativ\u00eb ndaj pasiguris\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Por kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb hipotez\u00eb politike q\u00eb duhet vler\u00ebsuar p\u00ebrmes sjelljes konkrete t\u00eb institucioneve dhe shoq\u00ebris\u00eb, jo nj\u00eb p\u00ebrfundim q\u00eb mund t&#8217;i atribuohet automatikisht \u00e7do vendimi t\u00eb presidentit serb.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr Serbin\u00eb, pyetja thelb\u00ebsore \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebse institucionet e saj mund t\u00eb garantojn\u00eb siguri pa e shnd\u00ebrruar frik\u00ebn n\u00eb mjet t\u00eb komunikimit politik.<\/p>\n<p>Protestat dhe kriza e besimit<\/p>\n<p>Nj\u00eb analiz\u00eb serioze e Serbis\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb kufizohet te veprimet e presidentit. Ajo duhet t\u00eb marr\u00eb parasysh edhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnien nd\u00ebrmjet pushtetit dhe nj\u00eb shoq\u00ebrie q\u00eb ka shprehur pak\u00ebnaq\u00ebsi p\u00ebrmes protestave, mobilizimit qytetar dhe k\u00ebrkesave p\u00ebr p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsi institucionale.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb raste t\u00eb tilla, m\u00ebnyra se si qeveria u p\u00ebrgjigjet kritikave b\u00ebhet tregues i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm i gjendjes demokratike.<\/p>\n<p>Nj\u00eb pushtet q\u00eb e konsideron protest\u00ebn si pjes\u00eb normale t\u00eb jet\u00ebs demokratike ka mund\u00ebsi t\u00eb ul\u00eb tensionet p\u00ebrmes dialogut, hetimeve t\u00eb besueshme dhe p\u00ebrgjigjeve institucionale. Kur protestuesit paraqiten n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjithshme si armiq, manipulues ose k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim p\u00ebr shtetin, hendeku nd\u00ebrmjet qeveris\u00eb dhe nj\u00eb pjese t\u00eb shoq\u00ebris\u00eb rrezikon t\u00eb thellohet.<\/p>\n<p>Kjo nuk n\u00ebnkupton se \u00e7do k\u00ebrkes\u00eb e protestuesve \u00ebsht\u00eb automatikisht e drejt\u00eb ose se \u00e7do veprim gjat\u00eb protestave \u00ebsht\u00eb i ligjsh\u00ebm. Do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsia p\u00ebr shkeljet duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktohet individualisht, nd\u00ebrsa e drejta p\u00ebr protest\u00eb paq\u00ebsore duhet t\u00eb mbrohet.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb afat t\u00eb gjat\u00eb, nj\u00eb shoq\u00ebri nuk b\u00ebhet m\u00eb e q\u00ebndrueshme duke e shtyr\u00eb pak\u00ebnaq\u00ebsin\u00eb jasht\u00eb debatit publik. P\u00ebrkundrazi, problemet e pazgjidhura mund t\u00eb grumbullohen dhe t\u00eb shnd\u00ebrrohen n\u00eb kriza m\u00eb t\u00eb thella t\u00eb besimit.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00ebtu q\u00ebndron edhe sfida e pushtetit n\u00eb Serbi: jo thjesht t\u00eb ruaj\u00eb kontrollin e situat\u00ebs s\u00eb dit\u00ebs, por t\u00eb d\u00ebshmoj\u00eb se institucionet mund t\u00eb funksionojn\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb pavarur nga interesat e nj\u00eb partie ose t\u00eb nj\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsi.<\/p>\n<p>Pse krahasimi me Millosheviqin ngjall shqet\u00ebsim?<\/p>\n<p>Krahasimi i Vu\u00e7iqit me Sllobodan Millosheviqin ka pesh\u00eb t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb n\u00eb Ballkan, sepse emri i k\u00ebtij t\u00eb fundit lidhet me nacionalizmin serb t\u00eb viteve \u201990, shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjen e Jugosllavis\u00eb dhe luft\u00ebrat q\u00eb shkaktuan pasoja t\u00eb r\u00ebnda njer\u00ebzore e politike.<\/p>\n<p>Megjithat\u00eb, krahasimet historike k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb kujdes.<\/p>\n<p>Ngjashm\u00ebrit\u00eb n\u00eb retorik\u00ebn nacionaliste, p\u00ebrqendrimin e pushtetit ose paraqitjen e vendit si t\u00eb rrethuar nga armiqt\u00eb mund t\u00eb sh\u00ebrbejn\u00eb si pika analize. Por ato nuk mjaftojn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrfunduar se dy udh\u00ebheq\u00ebs kan\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjtat synime ose se historia do t\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebritet n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn m\u00ebnyr\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Vlera e krahasimit q\u00ebndron te paralajm\u00ebrimi p\u00ebr mekanizmat q\u00eb mund ta dob\u00ebsojn\u00eb demokracin\u00eb: p\u00ebrdorimi i frik\u00ebs, kufizimi i pluralizmit, instrumentalizimi i nacionalizmit dhe dob\u00ebsimi i p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsis\u00eb institucionale.<\/p>\n<p>Historia e rajonit d\u00ebshmon se retorika politike nuk duhet n\u00ebnvler\u00ebsuar. Por ajo d\u00ebshmon gjithashtu se analiza duhet t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetet n\u00eb veprime konkrete, n\u00eb strukturat e pushtetit dhe n\u00eb vendimet q\u00eb merren, jo vet\u00ebm n\u00eb analogji me t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn.<\/p>\n<p>Prandaj, pyetja nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebse Vu\u00e7iqi \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebritje e Millosheviqit. Pyetja \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebse zhvillimet aktuale n\u00eb Serbi tregojn\u00eb dob\u00ebsim t\u00eb mekanizmave demokratik\u00eb dhe \u00e7far\u00eb pasojash mund t\u00eb ket\u00eb kjo p\u00ebr shoq\u00ebrin\u00eb serbe dhe rajonin.<\/p>\n<p>Nacionalizmi dhe politika e jashtme e Beogradit<\/p>\n<p>Politika e brendshme e Serbis\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb ndahet plot\u00ebsisht nga m\u00ebnyra se si Beogradi i trajton marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me fqinj\u00ebt.<\/p>\n<p>\u00c7\u00ebshtjet e Kosov\u00ebs, Bosnj\u00eb-Hercegovin\u00ebs, marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Malin e Zi dhe orientimi nd\u00ebrmjet Bashkimit Evropian, Rusis\u00eb dhe Kin\u00ebs jan\u00eb pjes\u00eb e nj\u00eb mjedisi t\u00eb nd\u00ebrlikuar politik e diplomatik.<\/p>\n<p>Kur temat komb\u00ebtare b\u00ebhen pjes\u00eb qendrore e mobilizimit politik, ato mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoren p\u00ebr t\u00eb forcuar mb\u00ebshtetjen e brendshme, p\u00ebr t\u00eb bashkuar segmente t\u00eb ndryshme t\u00eb opinionit publik ose p\u00ebr ta zhvendosur debatin nga \u00e7\u00ebshtjet e qeverisjes.<\/p>\n<p>Por kjo nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se \u00e7do q\u00ebndrim i Beogradit ndaj Kosov\u00ebs ose \u00e7do mosmarr\u00ebveshje me fqinj\u00ebt \u00ebsht\u00eb domosdoshm\u00ebrisht nj\u00eb manov\u00ebr p\u00ebr konsum t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm. Politika e jashtme ndikohet edhe nga interesa strategjike, llogaritje ekonomike dhe marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare.<\/p>\n<p>Ajo q\u00eb duhet v\u00ebzhguar \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00ebnyra se si kombinohen k\u00ebta faktor\u00eb dhe n\u00ebse tensionet e jashtme p\u00ebrdoren p\u00ebr t\u00eb kufizuar debatin e brendsh\u00ebm ose p\u00ebr t\u00eb justifikuar masa politike q\u00eb, n\u00eb rrethana t\u00eb tjera, do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonin llogaridh\u00ebnie m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn, kjo ka r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb. Nj\u00eb Serbi ku politika e jashtme ndikohet fuqish\u00ebm nga nevojat e mobilizimit t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm mund ta ket\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb nj\u00eb proces t\u00eb q\u00ebndruesh\u00ebm dialogu dhe t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarr\u00eb kompromise politike.<\/p>\n<p>Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb mund\u00ebsi q\u00eb duhet vler\u00ebsuar nga sjellja konkrete e Beogradit n\u00eb negociata, nga zbatimi i marr\u00ebveshjeve dhe nga vendimet zyrtare, jo thjesht nga retorika.<\/p>\n<p>\u00c7far\u00eb duhet t\u00eb kuptoj\u00eb Kosova nga zhvillimet n\u00eb Serbi?<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn, zhvillimet e brendshme n\u00eb Serbi kan\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi jo sepse \u00e7do protest\u00eb, kriz\u00eb politike ose demonstrim force n\u00eb Beograd p\u00ebrb\u00ebn k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb, por sepse m\u00ebnyra se si funksionon pushteti n\u00eb Serbi ndikon n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet dypal\u00ebshe dhe n\u00eb klim\u00ebn e siguris\u00eb n\u00eb rajon.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00ebse politika serbe b\u00ebhet m\u00eb e p\u00ebrqendruar rreth nj\u00eb udh\u00ebheqjeje t\u00eb vetme, n\u00ebse debatet e brendshme dominohen nga narrativat e k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit dhe n\u00ebse \u00e7\u00ebshtjet komb\u00ebtare p\u00ebrdoren p\u00ebr t\u00eb mobilizuar opinionin publik, at\u00ebher\u00eb mund t\u00eb zvog\u00eblohet hap\u00ebsira p\u00ebr vendime pragmatike n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Kosov\u00ebn.<\/p>\n<p>Por ky nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrfundim automatik. Politika e jashtme mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoret edhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb ulur tensionet, nd\u00ebrsa interesat ekonomike dhe presioni diplomatik mund t\u00eb krijojn\u00eb nxitje p\u00ebr bashk\u00ebpunim.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb arsye, Prishtina duhet t&#8217;i p\u00ebrcjell\u00eb zhvillimet n\u00eb Serbi me v\u00ebmendje, duke u mb\u00ebshtetur te informacioni i verifikuar dhe te vler\u00ebsimet e partner\u00ebve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>M\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishmja \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb kuptohet se politika e brendshme serbe nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb proces i mbyllur brenda kufijve t\u00eb saj. Ajo mund t\u00eb ndikoj\u00eb n\u00eb ritmin e dialogut, n\u00eb retorik\u00ebn ndaj Kosov\u00ebs dhe n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00ebn se si trajtohen krizat rajonale.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn koh\u00eb, nuk duhet ngat\u00ebrruar shoq\u00ebria serbe me udh\u00ebheqjen e saj politike. Qytetar\u00ebt, gazetar\u00ebt, organizatat e shoq\u00ebris\u00eb civile dhe protestuesit q\u00eb k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb llogaridh\u00ebnie nuk mund t\u00eb identifikohen automatikisht me politikat e qeveris\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Nj\u00eb dallim i till\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb thelb\u00ebsor p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar Serbin\u00eb p\u00ebrtej deklaratave t\u00eb presidentit dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb shmangur p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsimet q\u00eb d\u00ebmtojn\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet nd\u00ebrmjet shoq\u00ebrive.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebrfundim: Frika mund t\u00eb ruaj\u00eb kontrollin, por nuk e z\u00ebvend\u00ebson besimin<\/p>\n<p>Zhvillimet e fundit n\u00eb Beograd dhe vler\u00ebsimet p\u00ebr p\u00ebrdorimin e demonstrimit t\u00eb forc\u00ebs si instrument frik\u00ebsimi e rikthejn\u00eb v\u00ebmendjen te nj\u00eb \u00e7\u00ebshtje themelore: marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnia nd\u00ebrmjet pushtetit, shoq\u00ebris\u00eb dhe institucioneve demokratike n\u00eb Serbi.<\/p>\n<p>Nuk ka prova t\u00eb mjaftueshme q\u00eb vet\u00ebm shfaqja e automjeteve t\u00eb blinduara t\u00eb interpretohet si d\u00ebshmi e nj\u00eb plani t\u00eb caktuar politik ose ushtarak. Por \u00ebsht\u00eb legjitime t\u00eb shqyrtohet mesazhi q\u00eb p\u00ebrcillet nga demonstrimi i forc\u00ebs n\u00eb nj\u00eb klim\u00eb t\u00eb tensionuar dhe m\u00ebnyra se si ai lidhet me komunikimin politik t\u00eb pushtetit.<\/p>\n<p>Serbia ka nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr institucione q\u00eb nuk varen nga vullneti i nj\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsi, p\u00ebr media q\u00eb mund t\u00eb ushtrojn\u00eb funksionin e tyre pa presion dhe p\u00ebr nj\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb politike ku kritika nuk trajtohet si k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim ndaj shtetit.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00ebse stabiliteti paraqitet vazhdimisht si produkt i nj\u00eb figure t\u00eb vetme, rreziku \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00eb institucionet t\u00eb dob\u00ebsohen pik\u00ebrisht n\u00eb momentet kur vendi ka m\u00eb shum\u00eb nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr to.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr Kosov\u00ebn dhe rajonin, \u00e7\u00ebshtja ka r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi p\u00ebrtej debatit t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm serb. Nj\u00eb Serbi me institucione m\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegjshme, debat publik m\u00eb pluralist dhe politik\u00eb t\u00eb jashtme m\u00eb t\u00eb parashikueshme do t\u00eb krijonte kushte m\u00eb t\u00eb mira p\u00ebr marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme me fqinj\u00ebt. Anasjelltas, nj\u00eb klim\u00eb e dominuar nga frika dhe mobilizimi i vazhduesh\u00ebm politik mund ta v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsoj\u00eb dialogun dhe t\u00eb rris\u00eb pasigurin\u00eb rajonale.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb fund, testi p\u00ebr pushtetin n\u00eb Beograd nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm aft\u00ebsia p\u00ebr t\u00eb kontrolluar nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb organizuar nj\u00eb demonstrim force ose p\u00ebr t\u00eb dominuar komunikimin publik. Testi \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebse qytetar\u00ebt mund t\u00eb jetojn\u00eb pa frik\u00ebn se kund\u00ebrshtimi politik i v\u00eb n\u00eb konflikt me shtetin.<\/p>\n<p>Sepse frika mund t\u00eb krijoj\u00eb bindje t\u00eb p\u00ebrkohshme, por vet\u00ebm besimi te institucionet mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtoj\u00eb stabilitet t\u00eb q\u00ebndruesh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n<p>Prishtin\u00eb,25.10.2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Isuf B.Bajrami Kur pushteti e kthen frik\u00ebn n\u00eb instrument qeverisjeje Serbia po p\u00ebrballet me nj\u00eb&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":59659,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-59656","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-op-ed"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59656","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=59656"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59656\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":59660,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59656\/revisions\/59660"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/59659"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=59656"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=59656"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/faktiditor.ch\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=59656"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}